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Abstract
Dynamic games arise when multiple agents with differing objectives choose control a dynamic system. They model a wide variety of
applications in economics, defense, energy systems and etc. However, compared to single-agent control problems, the computational
methods for dynamic games are relatively limited. As in the single-agent case, only specific dynamic games can be solved exactly, and so
approximation algorithms are required. In this paper, we show how to extend a recursive Newton’s algorithm and the popular differential
dynamic programming (DDP) for single-agent optimal control to the case of full-information non-zero sum dynamic games. In the single-
agent case, convergence of DDP is proved by comparison with Newton’s method, which converges locally at a quadratic rate. We show
that the iterates of Newton’s method and DDP are sufficiently close for the DDP to inherit the quadratic convergence rate of Newton’s
method. We also prove both methods result in an open-loop Nash equilibrium and a local feedback O(ε2)-Nash equilibrium. Numerical
examples are provided.
Key words: Newton’s Method; Differential dynamic programming; Game theory; Optimization; Convergence.
1 Introduction
We study finite-horizon, unconstrained, discrete-time dy-
namic games or multistage games [1] with full informa-
tion in this paper. Such games arise when multiple agents
with differing objectives act upon one same dynamic sys-
tem. The system can be naturally discrete-time or emerge
from discretization of a differential game [2–5]. Dynamic
games have many applications including pursuit-evasion [6],
active-defense [7, 8], economics [9] and the smart grid [10]
. Despite a wide array of applications, the computational
methods for dynamic games are considerably less developed
than the single-agent case of optimal control.
1.1 Methods Overview
Dynamic games extend optimal control to multiple agents
aiming at optimizing different objective functions. The most
common solution concepts are open-loop Nash equilibria
(OLNE) and feedback Nash equilibria (FNE) [1, 2, 11].
Early works on OLNEs gave conditions for existence and
uniqueness of OLNEs for convex cost games [12] [13] [14].
Most pioneer works suggested using direct gradient descent
method to solve for the equilibria. Our work is along the
Email addresses: dixxx047@umn.edu (Bolei Di),
alampers@umn.edu (Andrew Lamperski).
approach of dynamic programming, Bellman recursion and
proper quadratic approximation, extending the classic New-
ton’s method and differential dynamic programming (DDP)
method.
Extending both the classic Newton’s method and DDP to
dynamic problems and their analysis are of great theoret-
ical and practical interests. The proposed stagewise New-
ton’s method first approximates the original problem with
a local quadratic dynamic game, then perform the Bellman
recursion of the approximated game, while the DDP method
solves the quadratically approximated Bellman recursion for
the original game. Both methods find an OLNE and ap-
proximate local FNE [1, 15]. Other than deriving their ba-
sic algorithmic forms, we prove that both the algorithms
converge quadratically in the neighborhood of strict station-
ary points and provided sufficient conditions for the station-
ary points to be Nash equilibria. While the convergence of
Newton’s method is locally qudratic and well-established,
to prove convergence of DDP method, we extend arguments
from [16, 17], which relate DDP iterates to those of New-
ton’s method, to the case of dynamic games.
1.2 Our Contribution
We are extending the numerical methods for dynamic games
by offering dedicated, practical algorithms for solving lo-
cally approximated open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria
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for unconstrained nonlinear systems, extending the classic
Newton’s method and differential dynamic programming.
We proved that the proposed algorithms inherit the quadratic
convergence rate of Newton’s method [18] and provided
sufficient conditions for the solutions to be OLNE and lo-
cally approximated FNE. Our proposed methods are two of
several parallel directions. As other parallel directions ded-
icated for dynamic games have not been worked out, and
generic static methods can be slow when applied, we believe
we have made a solid contribution.
1.3 Paper Outline
A literature survey is offered in Section 2. The general prob-
lem is formulated in Section 3. The algorithms are described
in Sections 4 and 5. Convergence proof is sketched and
equilibria are studied in Section 6. Section 7 discusses im-
plementation details. Numerical examples are described in
Section 8. Conclusions and future directions are discussed in
Section 9 while the proof details are given in the appendix.
2 Literature Survey
This section gives an overview of related numerical meth-
ods for dynamic games. We will discuss methods for
static games, including general Nash equilibrium problems
(GNEP) [19], Newton’s method [20] and NI relaxation al-
gorithm [21–25], and extremum seeking [26–28]. We will
also discuss methods for specialized dynamic games, such
as linear-quadratic games [29–34], potential games [35–40],
and zero-sum games [41, 42]. Finally, we will discuss
general methods based on Pontryagin’s Maximum Princi-
ple [1, 2, 4, 43]. These existing methods for games suffer
from different reasons when applied to nonlinear dynamic
games or only handle special cases. For a broad overview
of recent developments, see [44].
General Nash equilibrium problems (GNEP) study games
with (in)equality constraints [19]. GNEPs are reformulated
to a set of necessary conditions via KKT conditions, which
is in the form of variational inequalities (VI). These inequal-
ities can be solved via generic VI methods or classic feasibil-
ity problem methods, such as Newton’s method [20] or oth-
ers [45]. In particular, Newton’s method converts the com-
plementarity conditions to equality constraints via comple-
mentarity functions. While these static methods for GNEPs
can be applied to dynamic games, the iterations will have
computational complexity of O(T 3) where T is the num-
ber of stages, unless the dynamic structure is exploited. Our
proposed Newton’s method is closely in-line with Newton’s
method for QVIs [20] but more specialized and faster be-
cause of exploiting the dynamic structure.
Nikaido-Isoda function and relaxation algorithm (NIRA) is
another method for solving GNEPs [21–25]. The iteration
of this method is based on weighted average of the current
action and the optimum response function, which returns the
set of players’ actions that minimize each of their cost uni-
laterally given the current actions. The method converts the
relatively hard root-finding nature of solving for a NE to an
optimization problem. However, the convergence conditions
are very restrictive, including a weakly convex-concave NI
function and that the optimum response function is single
valued. It also does not utilize the dynamic structure, there-
fore does not scale well w.r.t. number of stages when applied
to dynamic games.
Methods for finding Nash equilibria of static games via ex-
tremum seeking were presented in [26–28, 46]. In particu-
lar, the controllers drive the system to a Nash equilibrium.
The work expands from linear system to general nonlinear
systems. For these works, each agent only requires mea-
surements of its own cost. Our method requires each agent
to have explicit model information, but gives equilibria for
finite-horizon dynamic games. This is particularly important
for games in which trajectories from initial to final states are
desired.
As in optimal control, linear-quadratic (LQ) systems for
games are well-understood prior to general systems and
serve as the backbone for many solution methods [29–34].
The existence of FNEs for linear-quadratic systems, and their
analytic computation by coupled Riccati equations, is well
understood [11,30,47]. The solution has also been extended
to infinite horizon and distributed information cases [48,49].
For a detailed description of the method for solving linear-
quadratic games see [15]; for the complete set of sufficient
conditions for discrete-time linear-quadratic games see [11].
In a potential game, a single potential function can be used
to describe the marginal costs for each player [35–40, 50].
Based on this property, potential games can often by solved
using methods of single-agent optimization or optimal con-
trol. This line of work has been extended to constrained
stochastic dynamic potential games [51]. However, the pre-
requisite that the game problem has a potential function is
very restrictive.
Zero-sum game is another closely related background to our
problems of interest. Two player zero-sum differential game
dates back to the work of Issacs [52], which is essentially a
min-max game. It has been extended to stochastic dynam-
ics in recent years [53, 54] for two player zero-sum game.
This stream of work is very closely related to robust control,
where the worst scenario behavior of a controller is opti-
mized [55]. [41, 42] applied DDP to zero-sum games with
two players, which is closely connected to our methods but
does not generalize to nonzero-sum games directly. Our pa-
per can be seen as a generalization of [42] to multi-player
nonzero-sum games with theoretical justification.
The standard solution method for an OLNE is via Pon-
tryagin’s Minimum Principle (PMP) for either continuous
or discrete-time problems, as recognized by the community
[1–5,43,56]. Although the PMP allows us to analyze the ex-
istence of solution and solve for analytical solutions for a few
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simple games, the resulting boundary value problem (BVP)
with optimization is, in general, hard to solve [1]. A more
approachable reformulation of the necessary conditions is
concatenating the KKT conditions of each player [1,19], in
which case, we arrive at a structured nonlinear programming
(NLP), or feasibility problem. Though it has been known
for years that such necessary conditions exist for games, we
have not found works on developing specialized algorithms
for solving these conditions, and generic solvers suffer from
high complexity due to not utilizing the dynamic structure.
Unlike its counterpart in optimal control, the KKT condi-
tions for games require users to solve a root-finding prob-
lem, for which, the conditions for existence of solution and
conditions for convergence of algorithm have not been de-
veloped.
3 Deterministic Nonlinear Dynamic Game Problem
Formulation
In this section, we introduce deterministic finite-horizon
nonlinear game problem, the notations for the paper, the dy-
namic programming solution and convergence criterion of
our proposed method.
3.1 Problem Formulation and Necessary Conditions
Problem 1 Nonlinear dynamic game
Each player tries to minimize their own cost
Jn(x,u) =
T
∑
k=0
cn,k(xk,u:,k), n = 1,2, ...,N (1)
Subject to dynamic constraints
xk+1 = fk(xk,u:,k), k = 0,1, · · · ,T −1 (2a)
x0 is fixed. (2b)
As indicated by the notations, we consider a game of T +1
steps played by N players. The state of the system at time
k is denoted by xk ∈ Rnx . Player n’s input at time k is
given by un,k ∈ Rnun . The vector of all players’ actions
at time k is denoted by u:,k = [u>1,k,u
>
2,k, . . . ,u
>
N,k]
> ∈ Rnu .
The cost for player n at time k is cn,k(xk,u:,k). This en-
codes the fact that the cost for one player can depend on
other players’ actions. In later analysis, some other nota-
tions will be helpful. The vector player n’s actions over all
time is denoted by un,: = [u>n,0,u
>
n,1, . . . ,u
>
n,T ]
>. The vector
of all actions other than those of player n is denoted by
u−n,: = [u>1,:, . . . ,u
>
n−1,:,u
>
n+1,:, . . . ,u
>
N,:]
>. The vector of all
states is denoted by x = [x>0 ,x
>
1 , . . . ,x
>
T ]
> while the vector
of all inputs is given by u = [u>1,:,u
>
2,:, . . . ,u
>
N,:]
>.
Note that since the initial state is fixed and the dynamics are
deterministic, the cost for each player can be expressed as
a function of all actions, i.e. Jn(u). Note that the dynamics
are implicitly substituted to eliminate the dependency on x
when we use Jn(u). We assume Jn(u) is twice differentiable.
One set of sufficient conditions for the differentiablity of
Jn(u) is that both the cost cn,k(xk,u:,k) and the dynamics
fk(xk,u:,k) share at least the same differentiability, which is
not very restrictive since most physical systems are governed
by ordinary differential equations.
A local Nash equilibrium (OLNE) for problem 1 is a set of
inputs u? such that
Jn(un,:,u?−n,:)≥ Jn(u?), n = 1,2, . . . ,N (3)
for all un,: in a neighborhood of u?n,:. In the context of dy-
namic games, this correponds to an open-loop, local Nash
equilibrium [11]. The equilibrium is called a strict local
Nash equilibrium if the inequality in (3) is strict for all un,: 6=
u?n,: in a neighborhood of u
?
n,:. For unconstrained games, the
following problem gives necessary conditions for a local
Nash equilibrium:
Problem 2 Necessary conditions. Find u? such that
J (u?)≡
[
∂J1
∂u1,:
∂J2
∂u2,:
· · · ∂JN∂uN,:
]>∣∣∣∣
u?
= 0 (4)
A trajectory of actions u is referred to as a stationary point
satisfying (4). Solving such necessary conditions is standard
which also arises in other works [1, 44, 57, 58].
3.2 Dynamic Programming Solution
The Bellman recursion method for solving optimal control
problems, extends to dynamic games [1,15]. Instead of solv-
ing for the minimizing action at each stage, equilibria of
stage-wise games are computed via the following recursion:
V ?n,T+1(xT+1) = 0 (5a)
Q?n,k(xk,u:,k) = cn,k(xk,u:,k)+V
?
n,k+1( fk(xk,u:,k)) (5b)
V ?n,k(xk) = minun,k
Q?n,k(xk,u:,k). (5c)
Here V ?n,k(xk) and Q
?
n,k(xk,u:,k) are referred to as equilibrium
value functions for player n at time step k. In particular,
if a solution to the Bellman recursion is found, the corre-
sponding optimal strategy for player n at time k would be
the un,k which minimizes Q?n,k(xk,u:,k). Note that (5c) de-
fines a static game with respect to the u:,k variable at step
k. A well known verification theorem states that a feedback
policy u:,k = φ ?k (xk), k = 0,1, ...,T solving the sequence of
static games defined by (5c), is a subgame perfect FNE for
the dynamic game [1, 15]. For general dynamic games, the
Bellman equations are not computationally tractable. Note
that the game ends at k = T , and setting V ?n,T+1(xT+1) = 0
is only for ease of describing the Bellman recursion.
3
3.3 Existence of Solutions and Convergence Conditions
To guarantee convergence, we assume that J (u) satisfies
the smoothness and non-degeneracy conditions required by
Newton’s method [18].
Assumption 1 (Smoothness) The vector-valued function,
J (u), is differentiable with locally Lipschitz derivatives.
Assumption 2 (Non-degeneracy) The Jacobian ∂J (u
?)
∂u is
invertible.
A sufficient condition for the smoothness assumptions is that
the functions fk and cn,k are twice continuously differentiable
with Lipschitz second derivatives. For either of our methods,
we will solve a sequence of stagewise quadratic games. As
we will see, a sufficient condition for invertibility of ∂J (u
?)
∂u
is the unique solvability of the stagewise games near the
equilibrium.
The non-degeneracy and smoothness conditions guarantee
that Newton’s method converges locally to a stationary point
satisfying (4). The following assumption guarantees that this
stationary point is a strict local Nash equilibrium.
Assumption 3 Each player’s Hessian, ∂
2Jn(u?)
∂ 2un,:
, is positive
definite, i.e. each player’s cost Jn(u) is strictly convex w.r.t.
their actions un,:.
3.4 Notations of Derivatives
We define the following shorthand notations for first and
second order derivatives of both the dynamics and cost func-
tions for given trajectory x¯, u¯, which are used in both the
stagewise Newton’s method and DDP method. The deriva-
tives show up because we are using quadratic approxima-
tions around trajectory.
Ak =
∂ fk(xk,u:,k)
∂xk
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
Bk =
∂ fk(xk,u:,k)
∂u:,k
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
(6a)
Glk =
 ∂
2 f lk
∂x2k
∂ 2 f lk
∂xk∂u:,k
∂ 2 f lk
∂u:,k∂xk
∂ 2 f lk
∂u2:,k
∣∣∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
, l = 1,2, . . . ,nx (6b)
Rk(δxk,δu:,k) =

[
δxk
δu:,k
]>
G0k
[
δxk
δu:,k
]
[
δxk
δu:,k
]>
G1k
[
δxk
δu:,k
]
...[
δxk
δu:,k
]>
Gnxk
[
δxk
δu:,k
]

(6c)
Mn,k =

2cn,k
∂cn,k
∂xk
∂cn,k
∂u:,k
∂cn,k
∂xk
> ∂ 2cn,k
∂x2k
∂ 2cn,k
∂xk∂u:,k
∂cn,k
∂u:,k
> ∂ 2cn,k
∂u:,k∂xk
∂ 2cn,k
∂u2:,k

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
(6d)
=

M11n,k M
1x
n,k M
1u
n,k
Mx1n,k M
xx
n,k M
xu
n,k
Mu1n,k M
ux
n,k M
uu
n,k
 .
4 Stagewise Newton’s Method
This section describes the stagewise Newton’s method for
dynamic games of the form in Problem 1. Subsection 4.1
gives a high-level description of the algorithms, while Sub-
section 4.2 describes the explicit matrix calculations.
4.1 Algorithm Overview
With a given trajectory u¯, the Newton step for solving (4) is
given by:
∂J (u¯)
∂u
δuN =−J (u¯). (7)
This rule leads to a quadratic convergence to a root in (4)
whenever ∇uJ (u) is locally Lipschitz and invertible [18].
The next two lemmas give game-theoretic interpretations of
the Newton step.
Lemma 1 If Assumptions 1- 3 hold, then solving (7) is
equivalent to solving the quadratic game defined by:
min
δun,:
Jn(u¯)+
∂Jn(u¯)
∂u
δu+
1
2
δu>
∂ 2Jn(u¯)
∂u2
δu (8)
Proof. Under the strict local equilibrium assumptions, (8)
has a unique solution which is found by differentiating with
respect to δun,: and setting the result to 0. Stacking these
equations leads precisely to (7). 2
Throughout the paper, we will assume that Assumptions 1-3
hold.
The next lemma shows that (8) can be expressed as a
quadratic dynamic game. It is proved in Appendix A.3.
Lemma 2 The quadratic game defined in (8) is equivalent
4
to the dynamic game defined by:
min
un,:
1
2
T
∑
k=0


1
δxk
δu:,k

>
Mn,k

1
δxk
δu:,k
+M1xn,k∆xk
 (9a)
subject to
δx0 = 0 (9b)
∆x0 = 0 (9c)
δxk+1 = Akδxk +Bkδu:,k (9d)
∆xk+1 = Ak∆xk +Rk(δxk,δu:,k) (9e)
k = 0,1, . . . ,T (9f)
where Ak, Bk, Mn,k, Rk(δxk,δu:,k) are defined in Section 3.4,
which are constants for given trajectory u¯.
Note that the states of the dynamic game are given by δxk
and ∆xk as
δxk =
T
∑
i=0
∂xk
∂u:,i
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
δu:,i (10a)
∆xlk =
T
∑
i=0
T
∑
j=0
δu>:,i
∂ 2xlk
∂u:,i∂u:, j
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
δu:, j, l = 1,2, . . . ,nx (10b)
It turns out that the Bellman equations (5) associated with
problem (9) can be solved analytically and the resulting
value functions have quadratic forms. The next lemma de-
scribes the explicit solution to (9) based on Bellman equa-
tion (5). It is proved in Appendix A.4.
Lemma 3 The equilibrium value functions for the dynamic
game defined by (9) are denoted as Vˆ u¯n,k(·) and Qˆu¯n,k(·, ·),
which can be expressed as
Vˆ u¯n,k(δxk,∆xk) =
1
2
[ 1
δxk
]>
Sn,k
[
1
δxk
]
+Ωn,k∆xk

(11a)
Qˆu¯n,k(δxk,∆xk,δu:,k) =
1
2


1
δxk
δu:,k

>
Γn,k

1
δxk
δu:,k
+Ωn,k∆xk

(11b)
where the matrices Sn,k, Γn,k, and Ωn,k can be computed
in a backward pass. Note that we use the superscript u¯ to
indicate the nominal trajectory that we are approximating
the original problem around. Detailed descriptions are given
by (13) in Section 4.2.
The next lemma gives the form of the solution based on the
value functions. Note that (11b) is now a quadratic game in
the u:,k variables which has unique solution [11]. The solv-
ability of these stagewise games indicates that the dynamic
game (9) is solvable, hence the equivalent game (7) has a
solution and ∂J (u
?)
∂u is invertible as we alluded to in Sec-
tion 3.3.
A sufficient condition for solvability of these games is given
in terms ofJ (u) is given in the following lemma. Its proof
is in Appendix A.5.
Lemma 4 If ∂J (u¯)∂u is invertible, the game defined by (9)
has a unique solution of the form:
u:,k = u¯:,k +Kkδxk + sk. (12)
4.2 Details of Stagewise Newton’s Method
Lemma 5 The matrices Sn,k, Γn,k, andΩn,k in (11) are com-
puted recursively by Sn,T+1 = 0, Ωn,T+1 = 0, and
Ωn,k = M1xn,k +Ωn,k+1Ak (13a)
Dn,k =
nx
∑
l=1
Ωln,k+1G
l
k (13b)
Γn,k = Mn,k
+

S11n,k+1 S
1x
n,k+1Ak S
1x
n,k+1Bk
A>k S
x1
n,k+1 A
>
k S
xx
n,k+1Ak +D
xx
k A
>
k S
xx
n,k+1Bk +D
xu
k
B>k S
x1
n,k+1 B
>
k S
xx
n,k+1Ak +D
ux
k B
>
k S
xx
n,k+1Bk +D
uu
k

(13c)
=

Γ11n,k Γ
1x
n,k Γ
1u1
n,k Γ
1u2
n,k · · · Γ1uNn,k
Γx1n,k Γ
xx
n,k Γ
xu1
n,k Γ
xu2
n,k · · · ΓxuNn,k
Γu11n,k Γ
u1x
n,k Γ
u1u1
n,k Γ
u1u2
n,k · · · Γu1uNn,k
Γu21n,k Γ
u2x
n,k Γ
u2u1
n,k Γ
u2u2
n,k · · · Γu2uNn,k
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
ΓuN 1n,k Γ
uN x
n,k Γ
uN u1
n,k Γ
uN u2
n,k · · · ΓuN uNn,k

(13d)
Fk =

Γu1u1k
Γu2u2k
...
ΓuN uNk
=

Γu1u11k Γ
u1u2
1k · · · Γu1uN1k
Γu2u12k Γ
u2u2
2k · · · Γu2uN2k
...
...
. . .
...
ΓuN u1Nk Γ
uN u2
Nk · · · ΓuN uNNk
 (13e)
Pk =

Γu1x1k
Γu2x2k
...
ΓuN xNk
 , Hk =

Γu111k
Γu212k
...
ΓuN 1Nk
 (13f)
sk =−F−1k Hk, Kk =−F−1k Pk (13g)
5
Sn,k =
[
1 0 s>k
0 I K>k
]
Γn,k

1 0
0 I
sk Kk
 (13h)
ls for k = T,T −1, . . . ,0.
Proof. By construction we must have Sn,T+1 = 0. Plug-
ging (9d) and (9e) into (11a) gives the backward iteration
of (13a)(13b)(13c). Since u:,k = u¯:,k +δu:,k and u¯:,k is con-
stant, the static game defined in (11b) can be solved in the
δu:,k variables. Differentiating (11b) by δun,k, collecting the
derivatives for all players and setting them to zero leads to
the necessary condition for an equilibrium:
Fkδu:,k +Pkδxk +Hk = 0. (14)
Thus, the matrices for the equilibrium strategy are given in
(13g). Plugging (12) into (11b) leads to (13h). 2
5 DDP Algorithms for Dynamic Games
This section describes the differential dynamic programming
algorithm for dynamic games of the form in Problem 1. Sub-
section 5.1 gives a high-level description of the algorithms,
while Subsection 5.2 describe the explicit matrix calcula-
tions.
5.1 Algorithm Overview
The idea of the differentiable dynamic programming (DDP)
is to maintain quadratic approximations of V ∗n,k and Q
∗
n,k
around a trajectory u¯ denoted by V˜ u¯n,k and Q˜
u¯
n,k, respectively.
We need some notation for our approximations. For a scalar-
valued function, h(z), we denote the quadratic approxima-
tion near z¯ by:
quad(h(z))z¯ =
1
2
[
1
δ z
]> 2h(z¯) ∂h(z¯)∂ z
∂h(z¯)
∂ z
> ∂ 2h(z¯)
∂ z2
[ 1
δ z
]
(15a)
δ z =z− z¯. (15b)
If h : Rn → Rm we form the quadratic approximation by
stacking all of the quadratic approximations of the entries:
quad(h(z))z¯ = [quad(h1(z))z¯, . . . , quad(hm(z))z¯]> (16)
Let x¯k and u¯:,k be a trajectory of states and actions satisfying
the dynamic equations from (2) and zk = [x>k ,u
>
:,k]
>. The ap-
proximate Bellman recursion around this trajectory is given
by:
V˜ u¯n,T+1(xT+1) = 0 (17a)
Q˜u¯n,k(zk) = quad(cn,k(zk)+V˜
u¯
n,k+1( fk(zk)))z¯k (17b)
V˜ u¯n,k(xk) = minun,k
Q˜u¯n,k(xk,u:,k). (17c)
The quadratic approximation is possible because fk(zk) and
cn,k(zk) are twice differentiable. Similar to stagewise New-
ton’s method and Lemma 4, the following lemma describes
the form of solution to (17c). It is proven in Appendix A.6.
Lemma 6 If ∂J (u¯)∂u is invertible, the game defined by (17c)
has a unique solution of the form:
u:,k = u¯:,k + K˜kδxk + s˜k. (18)
In the notation defined above, we have that δxk = xk− x¯k.
Note that if ∂J (u
?)
∂u is invertible, then
∂J (u¯)
∂u is invertible for
all u¯ in a neighborhood of u?.
Here we provide the pseudo code for both algorithms. Note
that an initial trajectory of x¯ should be found by running
the system with actions u¯, which are needed to compute
derivatives in (6).
Algorithm 1 Stagewise Newton’s and DDP methods for
Nonlinear Dynamic Games
Generate an initial trajectory x¯, u¯
loop
Backward Pass:
if Newton’s method then
Form the approximated dynamic game (9)
Compute Kk and sk from (12).
end if
if DDP then
Perform approximated Bellman recursion (17)
Compute K˜k and s˜k from (18).
end if
Forward Pass:
Generate a new trajectory using the affine policy de-
fined by Kk,sk or K˜k, s˜k
end loop
Obtaining stationary trajectory u?, x? and feedback policy
K˜?k , s˜
?
k
5.2 Details of DDP method
Using the notation from (6), (15), (16) and zk, the second-
order approximations of the dynamics and cost are given by:
quad( fk(zk))z¯k = fk(z¯k)+Akδxk +Bkδu:,k +Rk(δ zk)
(19a)
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quad(cn,k(zk))z¯k =
[
1
δ zk
]>
Mn,k
[
1
δ zk
]
. (19b)
By construction V˜ u¯n,k(xk) and Q˜
u¯
n,k(xk,u:,k) are quadratic, so
there must be matrices S˜n,k and Γ˜n,k such that
V˜ u¯n,k(xk) =
1
2
[
1
δxk
]>
S˜n,k
[
1
δxk
]
(20a)
Q˜u¯n,k(xk,u:,k) =
1
2

1
δxk
δu:,k

>
Γ˜n,k

1
δxk
δu:,k
 . (20b)
Lemma 7 The matrices in (20) are defined recursively by
S˜n,T+1 = 0 and:
D˜n,k =
nx
∑
l=1
S˜1x
l
n,k+1G
l
k (21a)
Γ˜n,k = Mn,k
+

S˜11n,k+1 S˜
1x
n,k+1Ak S˜
1x
n,k+1Bk
A>k S˜
x1
n,k+1 A
>
k S˜
xx
n,k+1Ak + D˜
xx
n,k A
>
k S˜
xx
n,k+1Bk + D˜
xu
n,k
B>k S˜
x1
n,k+1 B
>
k S˜
xx
n,k+1Ak + D˜
ux
n,k B
>
k S˜
xx
n,k+1Bk + D˜
uu
n,k

(21b)
=

Γ˜11n,k Γ˜
1x
n,k Γ˜
1u1
n,k Γ˜
1u2
n,k · · · Γ˜1uNn,k
Γ˜x1n,k Γ˜
xx
n,k Γ˜
xu1
n,k Γ˜
xu2
n,k · · · Γ˜xuNn,k
Γ˜u11n,k Γ˜
u1x
n,k Γ˜
u1u1
n,k Γ˜
u1u2
n,k · · · Γ˜u1uNn,k
Γ˜u21n,k Γ˜
u2x
n,k Γ˜
u2u1
n,k Γ˜
u2u2
n,k · · · Γ˜u2uNn,k
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
Γ˜uN 1n,k Γ˜
uN x
n,k Γ˜
uN u1
n,k Γ˜
uN u2
n,k · · · Γ˜uN uNn,k

(21c)
F˜k =

Γ˜u1u1,k
Γ˜u2u2,k
...
Γ˜uN uN,k
=

Γ˜u1u11,k Γ˜
u1u2
1,k · · · Γ˜u1uN1,k
Γ˜u2u12,k Γ˜
u2u2
2,k · · · Γ˜u2uN2,k
...
...
. . .
...
Γ˜uN u1N,k Γ˜
uN u2
N,k · · · Γ˜uN uNN,k
 (21d)
P˜k =

Γ˜u1x1,k
Γ˜u2x2,k
...
Γ˜uN xN,k
 , H˜k =

Γ˜u111,k
Γ˜u212,k
...
Γ˜uN 1N,k
 (21e)
s˜k =−F˜−1k H˜k, K˜k =−F˜−1k P˜k (21f)
S˜n,k =
[
1 0 s˜>k
0 I K˜>k
]
Γ˜n,k

1 0
0 I
s˜k K˜k
 , (21g)
for k = T,T −1, . . . ,0.
Proof. By construction we must have S˜n,T+1 = 0. Plugging
(19a) into (17b) and dropping all cubic and higher terms
gives (21a)(21b). Since u:,k = u¯:,k + δu:,k and u¯:,k is con-
stant, the static game defined in (17c) can be solved in the
δu:,k variables. Differentiating (20b) by δun,k, collecting the
derivatives for all players and setting them to zero leads to
the necessary condition for an equilibrium:
F˜kδu:,k + P˜kδxk + H˜k = 0. (22)
Thus, the matrices for the equilibrium strategy are given in
(21f). Plugging (18) into (20b) leads to (21g). 2
We can see that the matrices used in the recursions for both
DDP and stagewise Newton’s method are very similar in
structure. Indeed, the iterations are identical aside from the
definitions of the Dn,k and D˜n,k matrices.
6 Convergence and Equilibria
Remark 1 The calculations of Newton’s method and DDP
are for games are similar to those arising in single-agent op-
timal control. The difference is that the game case inverts the
matrices Fk and F˜k which are constructed from submatrices
of the value function matrices, Γn,k and Γ˜n,k. In contrast, the
single agent algorithms invert Γn,k and Γ˜n,k directly. It is due
to this difference, that the proof for game scenario requires
separate though similar treatment to those of [16, 17].
Throughout this section we will assume that both methods
are starting from the same initial action trajectory u¯ that is
close to the stationary point u? such that ‖u¯−u?‖= ε . Let
uN and uD be the updated action trajectories of stagewise
Newton’s method and DDP, respectively. We define update
steps δuN and δuD
uN = u¯+δuN uD = u¯+δuD. (23)
Now we are ready to introduce Theorem 1, which is our first
main result.
Theorem 1 If u? satisfies the necessary conditions (4) and
that ∂J (u
∗)
∂u is invertible, then both the stagewise Newton and
DDP algorithms converge locally to u? at a quadratic rate.
Furthermore, if Assumption 3 is true, u? is a time-consistent,
open-loop Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The convergence rate for stagewise Newton is natu-
ral since it is exactly Newton’s step to the root finding prob-
lem of (7) [18]. Furthermore, the Newton step satisfies:
‖u¯+δuN−u?‖= O(ε2). (24)
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See [18]. DDP method generates an update that is quadrat-
ically close to that of stagewise Newton’s method, i.e.
‖δuN − δuD‖ = O(ε2), which is supported by Lemma
11 and Lemma 12 in Appendix A.7, it inherits the same
quadratic convergence rate to local stationary point. The
proof is completed by the following steps:
‖u¯+δuD−u?‖= ‖u¯+δuN−u?+δuD−δuN‖ (25a)
≤ ‖u¯+δuN−u?‖+‖δuD−δuN‖ (25b)
= O(ε2). (25c)
Note that if Assumption 3 holds, i.e. each Jn is convex with
respect to un,:, (4) implies that the cost of player n is mini-
mized when the actions of the others are fixed, therefore u?
is an open-loop Nash equilibrium. By definition, an OLNE
u? for unconstrained games is time-consistent for dynamic
games [1] 2
Next we study the two closed-loop policies found by
the algorithms u:,k = φˆ ?k (xk) = u
?
:,k + K
?
k δxk + s
?
k and
u:,k = φ˜ ?k (xk) = u
?
:,k+ K˜
?
k δxk+ s˜
?
k . Recall the notation φ
?
k (xk)
denoting the true policy of FNE that solves (5) in Section 3.2.
Note that in (11), Vˆ u¯n,k(·) and Qˆu¯n,k(·) are written explicitly
as functions of δxk,δuk and ∆xk, which are equivalent to
specifying xk and uk for given u¯k, x¯k, hence we can write
Vˆ u¯n,k(xk) and Qˆ
u¯
n,k(xk,un,k) as explicit functions of xk and uk
in this section for consistency with other value functions.
We introduce the notations for feedback value functions
around the equilibrium u? as Qφ
?
n,k(·),V φ
?
n,k (·), Qˆφˆ
?
n,k(·),Vˆ φˆ
?
n,k (·)
and Q˜φ˜
?
n,k(·),V˜ φ˜
?
n,k (·) for the true, stagewise Newton and DDP
systems, respectively. Our second theorem states that the
feedback policies generated by stagewise Newton and DDP
are approximate local feedback Nash equilibria. The proof
is given in Appendix A.1.
Theorem 2 The approximations of the feedback equilib-
rium value functions V φ
?
n,k (xk), Q
φ?
n,k(xk,u:,k) of problem 1, are
given as Vˆ φˆ
?
n,k (xk), Qˆ
φˆ?
n,k(xk,u:,k) and V˜
φ˜?
n,k (xk), Q˜
φ˜?
n,k(xk,u:,k) by
Newton’s method and DDP method, respectively. The ap-
proximations are close in a neighborhood of ‖u−u?‖ = ε
in the sense
V φ
?
n,k (xk) = Vˆ
φˆ?
n,k (xk)+O(ε
2) = V˜ φ˜
?
n,k (xk)+O(ε
2) (26a)
Qφ
?
n,k(xk,u:,k) = Qˆ
φˆ?
n,k(xk,u:,k)+O(ε
2) (26b)
= Q˜φ˜
?
n,k(xk,u:,k)+O(ε
2) (26c)
Therefore the feedback policies found by the two approxi-
mating methods
u:,k = u?:,k +K
?
k δxk + s
?
k (27a)
u:,k = u?:,k + K˜
?
k δxk + s˜
?
k (27b)
give local feedback O(ε2)-Nash equilibria.
Note that OLNEs are not subgame perfect. Despite this
weakness, OLNEs are still valuable in cases where no feed-
back information is available, a model predictive control
(MPC) style strategy is applied or simply the system is suffi-
ciently deterministic. FNEs, on the other hand, are practical
for stochastic applications as is as long as the system does
not deviate too far from the nominal trajectory.
7 Implementation Details of the Algorithms
Despite their different origins, the two methods are almost
the same for applications. In general, it is hard to tell which
method works better for a specific application beforehand,
since DDP is a close approximation to stagewise Newton’s
method. In cases when there are multiple equilibrium strate-
gies, the algorithms might converge to different ones when
started from different initial trajectories.
7.1 Computing Derivatives
For complicated nonlinear dynamics and costs, modern al-
gorithmic differentiation (AD) software packages, such as
Tensorflow [59], Pytorch [60], CasADi [61], are strongly fa-
vored. Section 5.2 provides a form of DDP method based in
which derivatives of cn,k(xk,u:,k) and fk(xk,u:,k). However,
with the help of AD software, it is not the only way in prac-
tice. In the backward pass for the DDP method, the quadratic
approximation in (17b) and Γ˜k can be directly computed via
automatic differentiation, without computing the derivatives
of a single step Ak, Glk, Mn,k in (6) or keeping D˜n,k in (21a).
7.2 Regularization
To ensure that the algorithm converges regardless of ini-
tial condition, a Levenberg-Marquardt style regularization
should be employed. Such regularization has been used in
DDP algorithms for optimal control to ensure that the re-
quired inverses exist and that the solution improves [62,63].
We found in practice that regularization is essential to the
stability for both algorithms. We only use the notations for
DDP for simplicity in this section but the same insights hold
for stagewise Newton’s method. At each step k of the back-
ward pass, we checked the minimal eigenvalue en,k of matrix
Γ˜n,k. If the minimal eigenvalue en,k is less than a positive
value λ , we reset Γ˜n,k as
Γ˜n,k← Γ˜n,k +(λ − en,k)I, n = 1,2, · · · ,N (28)
where I is an identity matrix. The regularization penalizes
large steps in δx and δu. Thus, it improves the stability of
the algorithm, but sacrifices speed of convergence. The λ
in our examples are chosen via experimental trials and kept
constant for our examples in section 8. When the algorithm
was insufficiently regulated, the trajectories over iterations
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did not converge from the initial trajectory for our examples.
Changing the regularization over iterations while guarantee-
ing quadratic convergence has been studied in differential
dynamic programming literature and is referred to as adap-
tive shift for DDP [62]. Since it is not the focus of this paper,
we settled at a constant regularization that enabled smooth
and steady improvement of trajectories over iterations for
our examples.
7.3 Computational Complexity
The computational cost of both algorithms come mainly
from evaluating multiple derivatives according to (6) and do
backward passes according to either (13) or (21). The former
requires T evaluations of Ak, Bk, which are the first order
derivatives of the dynamic, T nx evaluations of Glk, which is
the second order derivative of the dynamic. T N evaluations
of Mn,k are also required as they contain the first and second
order derivatives of the cost functions. The latter consists
of mainly matrix multiplication and solving linear equations
in either (13g) or (21f). The overall complexity for both,
depending on the implementation, can roughly vary from
O(min(n2u,n
2
x)) to O(max(n
3
u,n
3
x)) for each step in the back-
ward pass, which is constant for given system and agents.
The advantage of both algorithms over other general GNEP
methods is that, the complexity w.r.t. number of stages is
linear, i.e. O(T ), since the only dependency on it is that we
need to do each stagewise computation for T times. As can
be seen based on the complexity analysis, the algorithms
are better suited for longer horizon (or finer discretization
of continuous problems) dynamic games, rather than games
with a large or infinite number of agents.
8 Numerical Examples
We apply the proposed algorithms for deterministic non-
linear dynamic games to two examples in this section. We
compare the performances of both algorithms on a simple
toy example first, and then apply the DDP method to a more
complicated problem. We gain proof of concept that both
methods performs reasonably close in practice and that they
can be extended to complicated models.
8.1 Owner-dog Dynamic Game
First we look at a toy example, which is implemented in
Python and all derivatives of nonlinear functions are com-
puted via Tensorflow [59].
We consider a simple 1-D owner-dog problem, with horizon
T = 10 and initial state x:,0 = [−1,2] where the dynamics of
the owner and the dog are given respectively by
x0,k+1 = x0,k + tanh(u0,k) (29a)
x1,k+1 = x1,k + tanh(u0,k) (29b)
k = 0,1, · · · ,T −1 (29c)
0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0
stages
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0
1
2
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ion
s
owner
dog
(a) DDP method
0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0
stages
−1
0
1
2
po
sit
ion
s
owner
dog
(b) stagewise Newton step
Fig. 1. Owner-dog dynamic game equilibrium trajectories. Lighter
colored trajectories are earlier in the overall iterations. The starred
trajectory is the final equilibrium solution. We sampled 8 trajec-
tories uniformly spaced out of 300.
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Fig. 2. This shows the 2-norm distance between inputs u¯ and the
final equilibrium u? over iterations for both algorithms.
The owner cares about going to x0,k = 1 and that the dog can
stay at x1,k = 2. The dog, however, only tries to catch up with
the owner. Each player also concerns themselves with the
energy consumption, therefore has a cost term related to the
magnitude of its input. Their cost functions are formulated
as
c0,k(x,u) = sigmoid((x0,k−1)2)+40(x1,k−2)2+(u0,k)2
(30a)
c1,k(x,u) = tanh2(x0,k− x1,k)+(u1,k)2 (30b)
k = 0,1, ...,T −1 (30c)
We use a different terminal cost that penalizes much more
heavily the owner for not reaching to their target x0,T = 1.
c0,T (x,u) = 100 sigmoid((x0,T −1)2)+40(x1,T −2)2
(31a)
c1,T (x,u) = tanh2(x0,T − x1,T ) (31b)
Nonlinear functions are added to the dynamics and costs
to create a nonlinear game rather than for explicit physical
meaning. We initialize a trajectory with zero input and initial
state, i.e. u¯= [0.,0., . . . ,0.] and x¯ = [−1,2,−1,2, . . . ,−1,2].
We used an identity regularization matrix with a magnitude
of λ = 30 as in (28) and performed 300 iterations from the
initial trajectory. Note that we started the iteration with a
trajectory that is far from a local equilibrium, therefore we
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do not expect the updates generated by both algorithms to
be close.
Fig. 1 shows the solutions found via both algorithms. In or-
der to keep the dog around x1,k = 2, the owner has to over-
shoot and then come back to x0,T = 1. The dog learns to get
closer to the owner over iterations, which is what we would
expect given how the problem is formulated. The stagewise
Newton’s step generated a smoother trajectory in this par-
ticular case. Fig. 2 shows the distances of input to the final
equilibrium over all 300 iterations. As can be seen that the
error reduces sub-linearly on a log scaled plot, which is evi-
dence that the algorithms converge quadratically. The stage-
wise Newton’s method converges quicker in this particular
case. Note that the two methods did not converge to the same
trajectory, which is because we fixed a regularization λ and
started far off the equilibrium. By tuning the regularization
with iterations or start from a closer trajectory to the equi-
librium, we should improve the situation, which is beyond
the scope of this paper.
8.2 Planar Robots Target Reaching
Here we consider an experimental setup in which three pla-
nar robots try to reach each of their own targets, while avoid-
ing collisions with other robots. The problem is set up such
that, if the robots ignore the existence of others and run
its own optimal trajectory, they will collide. We apply the
proposed DDP algorithm for game to solve for the equilib-
rium trajectories. This example is implemented in Python
and derivatives are computed via PyTorch [60].
Robots are modeled as circles on a plane with the location of
its center and a diameter. All robots share the same dynamics
given by (32). The state x:,k collects all vehicles’ positions
and xn,k picks the nth vehicle’s position at step k.
xn,k+1 = xn,k +(tanhun,k)dt, n = 1,2, . . . ,N (32)
where n enumerates all robots. The step cost of each robot
consists of a goal cost, a control cost and, and an avoidance
cost. To compute the avoidance cost, we check the distances
among robots at each step, when the robots do collide and
the distances become negative, we set it to the small positive
number, 0.01, for numerical stability. Cost functions follow
(33).
cn,k(xk,uk) =α(1− e−||xn,k−gn||2)+ ||un,k||2+
β∑
i 6=n
[− log(1− e−max(||xi,k−xn,k||−ri−rn, 0.01))]
(33)
n =1,2,3 (34)
where gn is the target of the nth vehicle, rn is the radius of
the nth robot, which are constants given the problem, α and
β are parameters controlling the relative weights of these
−2 −1 0 1 2
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−0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
target 1
target 2
target 3
player 1
player 2
player 3
Fig. 3. Robots trajectories over iterations. As can be seen that the
robots are taking indirect routes to their targets to avoid colliding
into each other. As we optimize over the trajectory via the proposed
algorithm, the trajectory becomes smoother and the end location
closer to the targets.
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Fig. 4. Snapshots of robots position of equilibrium trajactory.
Robots are avoiding each other and keeping proper distances from
each other.
three cost terms. The costs are coupled via the distances
between robots.
In our particular implementation, we used the parame-
ters T = 119, dt = 0.04, α = 10, β = 3 and ri = 0.25
for all robots. The targets are chosen as g1 = [−1,0]>,
g2 = [0.5,−0.866]> and g3 = [0.5,0.866]>. The robots are
initialize at x0 = [1.96,0.24,−0.72,1.39,−0.49,−2.00]>.
Figures 3, 4 and 5 show the result of implementing DDP
method to this problem where lighter color means values
from earlier iterations. An initial trajectory was generated
with a naı¨ve push-pull control, which assumes each robot
is being pulled to its target by an input that is proportional
to the distance to the target, and being pushed away from
other robots by an input that is inversely proportional to the
squared distance to the other robots. This simple control
scheme enables the robots to reach their targets given suf-
10
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steps
0
1000 player0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
steps
0
1000 player1
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
steps
0
1000 player2
Fig. 5. Cumulative costs. The cumulative cost for all robots reduces
over iterations.
ficient horizon but requires large inputs and takes sharper
turns therefore is far from optimal. Collisions did not hap-
pen in any iteration. A regularization magnitude of λ = 10
as in (28) was implemented in this example. Due to heavy
computational complexity, we only ran the algorithm for
7 iterations. Computing Jacobians in (17b) took up the
majority of the program’s runtime.
9 Conclusion and Future Directions
In this paper we have shown how Newton’s method and dif-
ferential dynamic programming extends to dynamic games.
Convergence of the methods are proven and nature of the
equilibria studied. A key step involved was finding explicit
forms for both DDP and stagewise Newton iterations that
enable clean comparison of their solutions. We demonstrated
the performance of both algorithms with nonlinear dynamic
games in simulation. Many extensions are possible. We will
examine larger examples and work on numerical scaling.
Derivative-free methods with convergence guarantee are also
attractive since they can be computationally faster and elim-
inate the dependence on analytical models. Both methods
can be applied as part of projected gradient descent style
methods or operator splitting method [64] to constrained
dynamic games. Additionally, handling scenarios in which
agents have imperfect model information will be of great
practical importance.
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A Auxiliary Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2
From the construction of Vˆ φˆ
?
n,k (xk) and V˜
φ˜?
n,k (xk), i.e.
(11a)(20a) and Lemma 11, we can see the quadratic coef-
ficients are O(ε) close, so the quadratic terms of stagewise
Newton’s method and DDP are O(ε2) close. The extra term
Ωn,k∆xk in Vˆ u
?
n,k(xk) is O(ε
2) small because Ωn,k is bounded
(Lemma 9 in Appendix A.2) and ∆xk = O(ε2) by con-
struction (10b). The linear coefficients of Qˆφˆ
?
n,k(xk,u:,k) and
Q˜φ˜
?
n,k(xk,u:,k) are O(ε
2) close, resulting in O(ε2) closeness
of the linear terms. Constant terms are proven to be O(ε2)
close. Therefore Vˆ φˆ
?
n,k (xk) = V˜
φ˜?
n,k (xk) + O(ε
2). It can be
proven similarly that Qˆφˆ
?
n,k(xk,u:,k) = Q˜
φ˜?
n,k(xk,u:,k)+O(ε
2).
DDP and stagewise Newton are generating feedback poli-
cies that achieve O(ε2) close value functions.
Based on Lemma 13 in Appendix A.8, we can perform
a backward induction style proof that the value func-
tions of stagewise Newton and the true value functions
are close. At the last step k = T , Qˆφˆ
?
n,T (xT , φˆ
?
T (xT )) =
Qφ
?
n,T (xT ,φT (xT )) +O(ε
2) is true by construction and all
players follow the policy by stagewise Newton, then
from each player’s perspective, an unconstrained mini-
mization problem is solved as is in the case of Lemma
13, therefore Vˆ φˆ
?
n,T (xT ) = V
φ?
n,T (xT ) + O(ε
2). Suppose
Vˆ φˆ
?
n,k+1(xk+1) = V
φ?
n,k+1(xk+1) +O(ε
2) holds, following the
Bellman equation
Qφ
?
n,k(xk,u:,k) = cn,k(xk,u:,k)+V
φ?
n,k+1( fk(xk,u:,k)) (A.1a)
Qˆφˆ
?
n,k(xk,u:,k) = quad
(
cn,k(xk,u:,k)
)∣∣
u¯,x¯+Vˆ
φˆ?
n,k+1( fˆk(xk,u:,k))
(A.1b)
where fˆk(xk,u:,k) is the dynamics for stagewise Newton’s
method given by (9d)(9e), which fˆk(xk,u:,k) = fk(xk,u:,k)+
O(ε2) by construction. Therefore Qˆφˆ
?
n,k(xk,u:,k)=Q
φ?
n,k(xk,u:,k)+
O(ε2) comparing (A.1a) and (A.1b). Apply Lemma 13
again, we can get Vˆ φˆ
?
n,k (xk) =V
φ?
n,k (xk)+O(ε
2). By the logic
of induction, it can be proven that for k = T,T −1, ...,0
V φ
?
n,k (xk) = Vˆ
φˆ?
n,k (xk)+O(ε
2) (A.2a)
Qφ
?
n,k(xk,u:,k) = Qˆ
φˆ?
n,k(xk,u:,k)+O(ε
2) (A.2b)
2
A.2 Background Results
We first derive a few useful results which are useful in the
main proofs.
Lemma 8 Let Fk be defined as in (13e). For u¯ in a neigh-
borhood of u?, F−1k exists and ρ(F
−1
k ) is bounded.
Proof. First, we bound the spectral radius of F−1k from
above
ρ(F−1k )≤ Fˆ (A.3)
where Fˆ is a constant. Consider inverting ∇uJ (u) in New-
ton’s method by successively eliminating δu:,k for k= T,T−
1, . . . ,0. The Fk matrices are exactly the matrices which
would be inverted when eliminating δu:,k. Since ∇uJ (u)
is Lipschitz continuous, its eigenvalues are bounded away
from zero in a neighborhood of u?. It follows that the eigen-
values of FK must also be bounded away from zero and F−1k
is bounded above. 2
Lemma 9 The following holds
Ωn,k =
∂
∂xk
T
∑
i=k
cn,i(xi,u:,i)
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
(A.4)
Proof. Ωn,k is constructed according to (13a). Equa-
tion (A.4) is true for k = T by construction. We proof
by induction and assume that (A.4) holds for k + 1, i.e.
Ωn,k+1 = ∂∂xk+1 ∑
T
i=k+1 cn,i(xi,u:,i)
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
, then
Ωn,k = M1xn,k +Ωn,k+1Ak (A.5a)
=
∂cn,k(xk,u:,k)
xk
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
+
(
∂
∂xk+1
T
∑
i=k+1
cn,i(xi,u:,i)
)
∂xk+1
∂xk
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
(A.5b)
=
∂cn,k(xk,u:,k)
xk
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
+
(
∂
∂xk
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
T
∑
i=k+1
cn,i(xi,u:,i)
)
(A.5c)
=
∂
∂xk
T
∑
i=k
cn,i(xi,u:,i)
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
(A.5d)
Therefore, (A.4) holds for k. And by induction, all k =
0,1, . . . ,T . 2
Lemma 10 The following is true
M1un,k +Ωn,k+1Bk =
∂Jn(u)
∂u:,k
∣∣∣
u¯
= O(ε) (A.6)
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Proof. ∂Jn(u)∂u:,k
∣∣∣
u¯
=O(ε) is true because Jn(u) is twice differ-
entiable hence Lipschitz, i.e.∣∣∣∣∣∣Jn(u)∂u:,k
∣∣∣
u¯
− Jn(u)
∂u:,k
∣∣∣
u?
∣∣∣∣∣∣≤ constant · ‖u¯−u?‖= O(ε) (A.7)
The first equality holds because
∂J(u)
∂u:,k
∣∣∣
u¯
=
∂
∂u:,k
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
T
∑
i=0
cn,i(xi,u:,i) =
∂
∂u:,k
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
T
∑
i=k
cn,i(xi,u:,i)
(A.8a)
=
∂
∂u:,k
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
cn,k(xk,u:,k)+
∂
∂u:,k
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
T
∑
i=k+1
cn,i(xi,u:,i)
(A.8b)
=M1un,k +
∂
∂xk+1
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
T
∑
i=k+1
cn,i(xi,u:,i)
∂xk+1
∂u:,k
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
(A.8c)
=M1un,k +Ωn,k+1Bk (A.8d)
2
These results are used implicitly in the later proofs of lem-
mas.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
First, we prove that the dynamics constraints (9d) and (9e)
are inductive definitions of (10a) and (10b). Note that x0 is
fixed so that (10a) and (10b) hold at k = 0. Now we handle
each of the terms inductively. For δxk+1, we have
δxk+1 =
T
∑
i=0
∂xk+1
∂u:,i
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
δu:,i
=
T
∑
i=0
∂ fk(xk,u:,k)
∂u:,i
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
δu:,i
=
∂ fk(xk,u:,k)
∂xk
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
T
∑
i=0
∂xk
∂u:,k
δu:,i+
∂ fk(xk,u:,k)
∂u:,k
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
δu:,k
= Akδxk +Bkδu:,k (A.9)
We used the fact that ∂ f (xk,u:,k)∂u:,i is zero unless i = k.
For ∆xk+1, row l is given by:
∆xlk+1 =
T
∑
i=0
T
∑
j=0
δu>:,i
∂ 2 f lk(xk,u:,k)
∂u:,i∂u:, j
∣∣∣
u¯
δu:, j (A.10a)
=
T
∑
i=0
T
∑
j=0
δu>:,i
(
∂ 2 f lk
∂u:,i∂u:, j
+(
∂xk
∂u:,i
)>
∂ 2 f lk
∂x2k
∂xk
∂u:, j
)∣∣∣
u¯
δu:, j
+
T
∑
i=0
T
∑
j=0
δu>:,i
(
(
xk
∂u:,i
)>
∂ 2 f lk
∂xk∂u:, j
+
∂ 2 f lk
∂u:,i∂xk
xk
∂u:, j
)∣∣∣
u¯
δu:, j
+
T
∑
i=0
T
∑
j=0
δu>:,i
(
nx
∑
p=1
∂ f lk
∂xpk
∂ 2xpk
∂u:,i∂u:, j
)∣∣∣
u¯
δu:, j (A.10b)
= δu>:,k
∂ 2 f lk
∂u2:,k
δu:,k +δx>k
∂ 2 f lk
∂x2k
δxk +δx>k
∂ 2 f lk
∂xk∂u:,k
δu:,k
+δu>:,k
∂ 2 f lk
∂u:,k∂xk
δxk +
nx
∑
p=1
∂ f lk
∂xpk
T
∑
i=0
T
∑
j=0
δu>:,i
∂ 2xpk
∂u:,i∂u:, j
δu:, j
(A.10c)
=
[
δxk
δu:,k
]>
Glk
[
δxk
δu:,k
]
+
nx
∑
p=1
Al pk ∆x
p
k (A.10d)
To get to each terms in (A.10c), we used the fact that
∂ 2 f lk
∂u:,i∂u:, j
= 0, for i 6= k or j 6= k (A.11a)
δxk =
T
∑
i=0
∂xk
∂u:,i
δu:,i =
k−1
∑
i=0
∂xk
∂u:,i
δu:,i (A.11b)
To get to (A.10d), we used the fact
∂ f lk
∂xpk
= Al pk (A.12a)
T
∑
i=0
T
∑
j=0
δu>:,i
∂ 2xpk
∂u:,i∂u:, j
∣∣∣
u¯
δu:, j = ∆xpk (A.12b) ∂
2 f lk
∂x2k
∂ 2 f lk
∂xk∂u:,k
∂ 2 f lk
∂xk∂u:,k
∂ 2 f lk
∂u2:,k
∣∣∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
= Glk (A.12c)
Both l and p are used to pick out the corresponding element
for a vector or matrix. Al pk means the lth row and pth col-
umn of matrix Ak. Equation (A.10d) actually describes each
element in (10b), so we have proven that both are true.
Next we prove (9a) is the quadratic approximation of Jn(u),
i.e.
quad(Jn(u))u¯ = Jn(u¯)+
∂Jn(u¯)
∂u
δu+
1
2
δu>
∂ 2Jn(u¯)
∂u2
δu
=
1
2
T
∑
k=0


1
δxk
δu:,k

>
Mn,k

1
δxk
δu:,k
+M1kn,k∆xk
 (A.13)
We need the explicit expressions for the associated deriva-
tives.
∂Jn(u)
∂u:,i
=
T
∑
k=0
(
∂cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂u:,i
+
∂cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂xk
∂xk
∂u:,i
)
(A.14a)
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∂ 2Jn(u)
∂u:,i∂u:, j
=
T
∑
k=0
(
∂ 2cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂u:,i∂u:, j
+
∂xk
∂u:,i
> ∂ 2cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂x2k
∂xk
∂u:, j
)
+
T
∑
k=0
(
∂xk
∂u:,i
> ∂ 2cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂xk∂u:, j
+
∂ 2cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂u:,i∂xk
∂xk
∂u:, j
)
+
T
∑
k=0
nx
∑
l=1
∂cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂xlk
∂ 2xlk
∂u:,i∂u:,i
(A.14b)
We break down each term in (A.13). First the second order
term.
δu>
∂ 2Jn(u¯)
∂u2
δu =
T
∑
i, j=0
δuT:,i
∂ 2Jn(u)
∂u:,i∂u:, j
∣∣∣∣
u¯
δu:, j (A.15a)
=
T
∑
i, j,k=0
δu>:,i
(
∂ 2cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂u:,i∂u:, j
∣∣∣∣
u¯
)
δu:, j
+
T
∑
i, j,k=0
δu>:,i
(
∂xk
∂u:,i
> ∂ 2cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂x2k
∣∣∣∣
u¯
∂xk
∂u:, j
)
δu:, j
+
T
∑
i, j,k=0
δu>:,i
(
∂xk
∂u:,i
> ∂ 2cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂xk∂u:, j
∣∣∣∣
u¯
)
δu:, j
+
T
∑
i, j,k=0
δu>:,i
(
∂ 2cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂u:,i∂xk
∣∣∣∣
u¯
∂xk
∂u:, j
)
δu:, j
+
T
∑
k=0
n
∑
p=1
∂cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂xpk
∣∣∣∣
u¯
T
∑
i, j=0
δu>:,i
∂ 2xpk
∂u:,i∂u:,i
δu:, j
(A.15b)
=
T
∑
k=0
(
δu>:,k
∂ 2cn,k
∂u2:,k
∣∣∣∣
u¯
δu:,k +δx>k
∂ 2cn,k
∂x2k
∣∣∣∣
u¯
δxk
)
+
T
∑
k=0
(
δx>k
∂ 2cn,k
∂xk∂u:,k
|u¯δu:,k +δu>:,k
∂ 2cn,k
∂u:,k∂xk
∣∣∣∣
u¯
δxk
)
+
T
∑
k=0
n
∑
p=1
∂cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂xpk
∆xpk (A.15c)
=
T
∑
k=0
[ δxk
δu:,k
]> ∂
2cn,k
∂x2k
∂ 2cn,k
∂xk∂u:,k
∂ 2cn,k
∂u:,k∂xk
∂ 2cn,k
∂u2:,k
∣∣∣∣
u¯
[
δxk
δu:,k
]
+
(
∂cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂xk
∆xk
)
(A.15d)
The first term in (A.15b) to (A.15c) holds because
cn,k(xk,u:,k) only depends directly on u:,i and u:, j when
i = j = k. The others hold because xk only depends on u:,i
and u:, j when i, j < k. The last term uses the definition of
∆xk in (10b).
The first order term
∂Jn(u¯)
∂u
δu =
T
∑
i=0
∂Jn(u)
∂u:,i
δu:,i (A.16a)
=
T
∑
i,k=0
(
∂cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂u:,i
+
∂cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂xk
∂xk
∂u:,i
)
δu:,i
(A.16b)
=
T
∑
k=0
(
∂cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂u:,k
δu:,k +
∂cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂xk
T
∑
i=0
∂xk
∂u:,i
)
(A.16c)
=
T
∑
k=0
(
∂cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂u:,k
δu:,k +
∂cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂xk
δxk
)
(A.16d)
And constant term
Jn(u¯) =
T
∑
k=0
cn,k(x¯k, u¯:,k) (A.17)
From (A.15), (A.16), and (A.17) it follows that (A.13) is
true. 2
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Substituting the approximated dynamic game (9) to the Bell-
man equation (5) leads us to,
Vˆ u¯n,T+1(δxT+1,∆xT+1) = 0 (A.18a)
Qˆu¯n,k(δxk,∆xk,δu:,k) =
1
2


1
δxk
δu:,k

>
Mn,k

1
δxk
δu:,k
+M1xn,k∆xk

+Vˆ u¯n,k+1(Akδxk +Bkδu:,k,Ak∆xk +Rk(δxk,δu:,k))
(A.18b)
Vˆ u¯n,k(δxk,∆xk) = minδun,k
Qˆu¯n,k(δxk,∆xk,δu:,k).
(A.18c)
Note that (A.18c) defines a static quadratic game and
Vˆ u¯n,k(δxk,∆xk) is found by solving the game and substituting
the solution back to Qˆu¯n,k(δxk,∆xk,δu:,k).
Solving the equilibrium strategy and Vˆ u¯n,k(δxk,∆xk) based on
Qˆu¯n,k(δxk,∆xk,δu:,k) is the same as how we arrived at (22)
and (21g), since the extra terms of ∆xk are not coupled with
δu:,k and other terms are of the exact same form. The step-
ping back in time of Qˆu¯k(δxk,∆xk,δu:,k) is acheived by sub-
stituting (9d) and (9e) into (11a), which is slightly different
because of the extra terms related to ∆xk.
Qˆu¯n,k(δxk,∆xk,δu:,k) (A.19a)
15
=
1
2


1
δxk
δu:,k

>
Mn,k

1
δxk
δu:,k
+M1kn,k∆xk

+Vˆ u¯n,k+1(Akδxk +Bkδuk,Ak∆xk +Rk(δxk,δu:,k))
(A.19b)
=
1
2


1
δxk
δu:,k

>
Mn,k

1
δxk
δu:,k

+
1
2

1
δxk
δu:,k

>
S11n,k+1 S
1x
n,k+1Ak S
1x
n,k+1Bk
A>k S
x1
n,k+1 A
>
k S
xx
n,k+1Ak A
>
k S
xx
n,k+1Bk
B>k S
x1
n,k+1 B
>
k S
xx
n,k+1Ak B
>
k S
xx
n,k+1Bk


1
δxk
δu:,k

+
1
2
(
(M1kn,k +Ωn,k+1Ak)∆xk
)
+
1
2
[ δxk
δu:,k
]>
Dn,k
[
δxk
δu:,k
] (A.19c)
So (13a), (13b) and (13c) are true. 2
A.5 Proof of Lemma 4
As discussed in the proof of Lemma 5, a necessary condition
for the solution of (11b) is given by (14). Thus, a sufficient
condition for a unique solution is that Fk be invertible. At
the beginning of the appendix, we showed that F−1k exists
near u? and that its spectral radius is bounded. So the game
definded by (11b) has a unique solution. 2
A.6 Proof of Lemma 6
As discussed in the proof of Lemma 5, a necessary condition
for the solution of (17c) is given by (18). Thus, a sufficient
condition for a unique solution is that F˜k be invertible. At
the beginning of the appendix, we showed that F−1k exists
near u? and that its spectral radius is bounded.
Now we show that F˜k exists and ρ(F˜−1k ) is bounded.
Lemma 11 implies that F˜k = Fk +O(ε). It follows that
F˜−1k = (Fk+O(ε))
−1 = F−1k −F−1k O(ε)F−1k = F−1k +O(ε).
It follows that F˜−1k exists and is bounded in a neighborhood
of u?. 2
A.7 Closeness Lemmas
This section contains lemmas that prove the updates gener-
ated by stagewise Newton’s method and DDP are close. The
first lemma shows that the matrices used in the backwards
recursions are close.
Lemma 11 The matrices from the backwards recursions of
DDP and stagewise Newton’s method are close in the fol-
lowing sense:
D˜n,k = Dn,k +O(ε) (A.20a)
S1xn,k =Ωn,k +O(ε) (A.20b)
S˜1xn,k =Ωn,k +O(ε) (A.20c)
S˜1xn,k = S
1x
n,k +O(ε
2) (A.20d)
S˜11n,k = S
11
n,k +O(ε
2) (A.20e)
S˜n,k = Sn,k +O(ε) (A.20f)[
Γ˜1xn,k Γ˜
1u
n,k
]
=
[
Γ1xn,k Γ
1u
n,k
]
+O(ε2) (A.20g)
Γ˜11n,k = Γ
11
n,k +O(ε
2) (A.20h)
Γ˜n,k = Γn,k +O(ε) (A.20i)
Γ1un,k = O(ε) (A.20j)
Γ˜1un,k = O(ε) (A.20k)
and that
F˜k = Fk +O(ε) (A.21a)
P˜k = Pk +O(ε) (A.21b)
H˜k = Hk +O(ε2) (A.21c)
H˜k = O(ε) (A.21d)
Hk = O(ε) (A.21e)
s˜k = sk +O(ε2) (A.21f)
s˜k = O(ε) (A.21g)
sk = O(ε) (A.21h)
K˜k = Kk +O(ε), (A.21i)
Proof. We give a proof by induction. For k = T , because of
the way these variables are constructed, they are identical,
i.e.
Γn,T =Γ˜n,T (A.22a)
FT =F˜T (A.22b)
PT =P˜T (A.22c)
HT =H˜T (A.22d)
sT =s˜T (A.22e)
KT =K˜T (A.22f)
Sn,T =S˜n,T (A.22g)
so we have (A.20d) (A.20f) (A.20g) (A.20i) (A.20h) (A.21a)
(A.21b) (A.21c) (A.21f) (A.21i) hold for k = T .
We also know that
M1un,T =
∂cn,T
∂uT
=
∂Jn(u)
∂uT
= O(ε) (A.23)
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where the first equality is by construction, the second is true
because uT only appears in Jn(u) in cn,T . By construction,
Γ1un,T = Γ˜1un,T = M1un,T = O(ε), so (A.20j)(A.20k) are true for
k = T . Similarly, HT and H˜T are constructed from Γu1n,T and
Γ˜u1n,T , so (A.21d)(A.21e) are true for k = T .
Because F−1k is bounded above, sT =−F−1T HT =−F−1T O(ε)=
O(ε). Similarly, s˜T = O(ε). Equations (A.21g)(A.21h) are
true for k = T .
From (13h) and Γn,T = Mn,T , we can get
S1xn,T =M
1x
n,T +M
1u
n,T KT + s
>
T (M
ux
n,T +M
uu
n,T KT ) (A.24a)
=Ωn,T +O(ε)KT +O(ε)(Muxn,T +M
uu
n,T KT ) (A.24b)
=Ωn,T +O(ε) (A.24c)
because Mn,T is bounded. Hence (A.20b) is true. Further,
(A.20c) is also true.
The time indices for Dn,T−1 and D˜n,T−1 go to a maximum
of T − 1, so to prove things inductively, we need (A.20a)
to hold for k = T −1. The difference between constructions
of Dn,T−1 and D˜n,T−1 is in that the former uses Ωn,T and
the later uses S˜1xn,T . But since we have proved that Ωn,T =
S˜1xn,T +O(ε), and GT−1 is bounded, we can also conclude
Dn,T−1 = D˜n,T−1 +O(ε). Therefore (A.20a) is true for k =
T −1.
So far, we have proved that for the last step, either k = T
or k = T − 1, (A.20)(A.21) are true. Assuming except for
(A.20a), (A.20)(A.21) are true for k+1 and (A.20a) is true
for k. If we can prove all equations hold one step back, our
proof by induction would be done.
Assume (A.20a) holds for k and other equations in
(A.20)(A.21) hold for k+1. Readers be aware that we use
these assumptions implicitly in the derivations following.
From (13c) we can get
Γ1un,k =M
1u
k,T +S
1x
n,k+1Bk (A.25a)
=M1uk,T +Ωn,k+1Bk +O(ε)Bk (A.25b)
=O(ε) (A.25c)
Here we used (A.6). Similarly, we can prove Γ˜1un,k = O(ε).
So (A.20j) and (A.20k) hold for k.
From (13c) and (21b) we can compute the difference be-
tween Γ˜n,k and Γn,k as
Γ˜n,k−Γn,k
=

S˜11n,k+1−S11n,k+1 0 0
A>k (S˜
x1
n,k+1−Sx1n,k+1) 0 0
B>k (S˜
x1
n,k+1−Sx1n,k+1) 0 0

+

0 (S˜1xn,k+1−S1xn,k+1)Ak 0
0 A>k (S˜
xx
n,k+1−Sxxn,k+1)Ak +(D˜xxk −Dxxk ) 0
0 B>k (S˜
xx
n,k+1−Sxxn,k+1)Ak +(D˜uxk −Duxk ) 0

+

0 0 (S˜1xn,k+1−S1xn,k+1)Bk
0 0 A>k (S˜
xx
n,k+1−Sxxn,k+1)Bk +(D˜xuk −Dxuk )
0 0 B>k (S˜
xx
n,k+1−Sxxn,k+1)Bk +(D˜uuk −Duuk )
 (A.26a)
=

O(ε2) AkO(ε2) BkO(ε2)
A>k O(ε
2) A>k O(ε)Ak +O(ε) A
>
k O(ε)Bk +O(ε)
B>k O(ε
2) B>k O(ε)Ak +O(ε) B
>
k O(ε)Bk +O(ε)

(A.26b)
=

O(ε2) O(ε2) O(ε2)
O(ε2) O(ε) O(ε)
O(ε2) O(ε) O(ε)
 (A.26c)
from which we can see that (A.20h)(A.20g) and (A.20i) are
true. Once we proved the closeness between Γ˜n,k and Γn,k
and the specific terms are O(ε), i.e. (A.20g) to (A.20k),
because of they way they are constructed from Γ˜n,k and Γn,k,
it is safe to say
F˜k = Fk +O(ε) (A.27a)
P˜k = Pk +O(ε) (A.27b)
H˜k = Hk +O(ε2) (A.27c)
H˜k = O(ε) (A.27d)
Hk = O(ε) (A.27e)
Therefore, (A.21a), (A.21b), (A.21c), (A.21d) and (A.21e)
are true for k.
Now that we have the results with Fk, F˜k, Hk, H˜k, Pk and P˜k,
we can move to what are immediately following, i.e. sk, s˜k,
Kk and K˜k.
sk =−F−1k Hk =−F−1k O(ε) = O(ε) (A.28)
which is true because F−1k is bounded above. Similarly, we
have s˜k = O(ε). Equations (A.21g) and (A.21h) are true.
s˜k =−F˜−1k H˜k =−(Fk +O(ε))−1(Hk +O(ε2)) (A.29a)
=−(F−1k +O(ε))(Hk +O(ε2)) (A.29b)
=−F−1k Hk +F−1k O(ε2)+HkO(ε)+O(ε2) (A.29c)
= sk +O(ε2) (A.29d)
K˜k =−F˜−1k P˜k =−(Fk +O(ε))−1(Pk +O(ε)) (A.29e)
=−(F−1k +O(ε))(Pk +O(ε)) (A.29f)
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=−F−1k Pk +(F−1k +Pk)O(ε)+O(ε2) (A.29g)
= Kk +O(ε) (A.29h)
Equations (A.21f) and (A.21i) are true for k.
Now we are equipped to get closeness/small results for Sn,k
and S˜n,k.
S˜n,k−Sn,k
=
[
1 0 0
0 I K˜>k
]
Γ˜n,k

1 0
0 I
0 K˜k
−
[
1 0 0
0 I K>k
]
Γn,k

1 0
0 I
0 Kk

+
[
s˜>k Γ˜
uu
n,k s˜k +2s˜
>
k Γ˜
u1
n,k− s>k Γuun,ksk−2s>k Γu1n,k 0
(Γ˜xun,k + Γ˜
uu
n,kK˜k)s˜k− (Γuxn,k +Γuun,kKk)>sk 0
]
+
[
0 s˜>k (Γ˜
ux
n,k + Γ˜
uu
n,kK˜k)− s>k (Γuxn,k +Γuun,kKk)
0 0
]
(A.30a)
=
[
Γ˜11n,k Γ˜
1x
n,k + Γ˜
1u
n,kK˜
Γ˜x1n,k + K˜
>Γ˜u1n,k Γ˜
xx
n,k +2Γ˜
xu
n,kK˜+ K˜
>Γ˜uun,kK˜
]
−
[
Γ11n,k Γ
1x
n,k +Γ
1u
n,kK
Γx1n,k +K
>Γu1n,k Γ
xx
n,k +2Γ
xu
n,kK+K
>Γuun,kK
]
+
[
O(ε2) O(ε2)
O(ε2) 0
]
(A.30b)
=
[
O(ε2) O(ε2)
O(ε2) O(ε)
]
(A.30c)
(A.30d)
So that (A.20e), (A.20d) and (A.20f) are true for k.
S1xn,k = M
1x
n,k +S
1x
n,k+1Ak +Γ
1u
n,kKk + s
>
k (Γ
ux
n,k +Γ
uu
n,kKk)
(A.31a)
= M1xn,k +Ωn,k+1Ak +AkO(ε)
+KkO(ε)+(Γuxn,k +Γ
uu
n,kKk)O(ε) (A.31b)
=Ωn,k +O(ε) (A.31c)
Therefore, (A.20b) holds and then naturally (A.20c) holds.
We continue to prove that D˜n,k−1 and Dn,k−1 are close, which
is true because
D˜n,k−1 =
nx
∑
l=1
S˜1x
l
n,kG
l
k (A.32a)
=
nx
∑
l=1
(Ωln,k +O(ε))G
l
k (A.32b)
=
nx
∑
l=1
Ωln,kG
l
k +O(ε) (A.32c)
=Dn,k−1+O(ε) (A.32d)
So (A.20a) is true. 2
The following lemma shows that the states and actions com-
puted in the update steps of both algorithms are close.
Lemma 12 The updates by two algorithms are small and
close
δxDk+1 =Akδx
D
k +Bkδu
D
k +O(ε
2) (A.33a)
δxNk+1 =Akδx
N
k +Bkδu
N
k +O(ε
2) (A.33b)
δuNk = O(ε) (A.33c)
δuDk = O(ε) (A.33d)
δxNk = O(ε) (A.33e)
δxDk = O(ε) (A.33f)
δuNk −δuDk =O(ε2) (A.33g)
δxNk −δxDk =O(ε2) (A.33h)
δuN−δuD =O(ε2) (A.33i)
‖u¯+δuN−u?‖=O(ε2). (A.33j)
‖u¯+δuD−u?‖=O(ε2). (A.33k)
Proof. Equation (A.33a) comes directly from the Taylor se-
ries expansion of (2) and (A.33b) from (9d).
We prove (A.33c) to (A.33h) by induction. For k= 0, δxN0 =
δxD0 = 0 and δu
N
0 = s0, δx
D
0 = s˜0. We know from the proof
of lemma 11 that s0 = s˜0+O(ε2), s0 =O(ε) and s˜0 =O(ε),
so (A.33c) to (A.33h) hold for k = 0. Assume (A.33c) to
(A.33h) hold for k, then
δuNk+1 = Kk+1δx
N
k + sk+1 = O(ε) (A.34a)
δuDk+1 = K˜k+1δx
N
k + s˜k+1 = O(ε) (A.34b)
δxNk+1 =Akδx
N
k +Bkδu
N
k +O(ε
2) = O(ε)
(A.34c)
δxDk+1 =Akδx
D
k +Bkδu
D
k +O(ε
2) = O(ε)
(A.34d)
δuNk+1−δuDk+1 =KkδxNk − K˜kδxDk + sk− s˜k (A.34e)
=KkδxNk − (Kk +O(ε))(δxNk +O(ε2))
+O(ε2) (A.34f)
=O(ε)δxNk +O(ε
2) (A.34g)
=O(ε2) (A.34h)
δxNk+1−δxDk+1 =Ak(δxNk −δxDk )+Bk(δuNk −δuDk )+O(ε2)
=O(ε2) (A.34i)
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So (A.33c) to (A.33h) hold for k+ 1 and the proof by in-
duction is done. Equation (A.33i) comes directly as a result.
Equation (A.33j) is classic convergence analysis for New-
ton’s method [18]. Equation (A.33k) follows directly from
(A.33i) and (A.33j). 2
A.8 Feedback Policy Approximation Lemma
Lemma 13 Given an unconstrained optimization problem
with a differentiable objective
min
x
f (x, p) (A.35)
According to the implicit function theorem, there exists a
feedback policy x= φ(p) in the neighborhood ε = ‖δ p‖ that
solves the necessary condition of the optimization problem
that
∂ f (x, p)
∂x
= 0 (A.36)
There exists a feedback policy δx = x¯+Kδ p that solves
min
x
quad( f (x, p))|x¯,p¯ (A.37)
where x¯ = φ(p¯) and ∂ f (x¯,p¯)∂x = 0, and approximates the true
solution locally well in the sense
f (x¯+Kδ p, p¯+δ p) = f (φ(p), p)+O(ε2) (A.38)
Proof. We consider x and p values in the neighborhood of
x¯ and p¯, define x = x¯+ δx, p = p¯+ δ p and ‖δ p‖ = ε . All
derivatives in this proof are evaluated at x¯ and p¯. Expand
x = φ(p)
x¯+δx = φ(p¯)+
∂φ
∂ p
δ p+O(ε2) (A.39a)
δx =
∂φ
∂ p
δ p+O(ε2) = O(ε) (A.39b)
The quadratic approximation is expanded as
quad( f (x, p))x¯,p¯ = f (x¯, p¯)+[
∂ f
∂x
∂ f
∂ p
]∣∣∣
x¯,p¯
[
δx
δ p
]
+
1
2
[
δx
δ p
]>  ∂ 2 f∂x2 ∂ 2 f∂x∂ p
∂ 2 f
∂ p∂x
∂ 2 f
∂ p2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
x¯,p¯
[
δx
δ p
]
(A.40)
It can be seen that the δx minimizes the approximation is
δx =−
(
∂ 2 f
∂x2
)−1 ∂ 2 f
∂x∂ p
δ p−
(
∂ 2 f
∂x2
)−1 ∂ f
∂x
= Kδ p+ s
(A.41)
where all derivatives are evaluated at x¯, p¯. Because ∂ f (x¯,p¯)∂x =
0, the constant term s is zero. Therefore δx=Kδ p minimizes
the quadratic approximation.
Two inequalities come naturally from φ(p) and Kδ p are
minimizers of (A.35)(A.40).
f (φ(p), p)≤ f (x¯+Kδ p, p¯+δ p)
(A.42a)
quad( f (x¯+Kδ p, p¯+δ p))|x¯,p¯ ≤ quad ( f (φ(p), p))|x¯,p¯
(A.42b)
Taylor series expansion
f (φ(p), p) = f (φ(p¯)+
∂φ
∂ p
δ p+O(ε2), p¯+δ p+O(ε2))
(A.43a)
= f (x¯, p¯)+
∂ f
∂x
∂φ
∂ p
δ p+
∂ f
∂ p
δ p+O(ε2)
(A.43b)
= f (x¯, p¯)+
∂ f
∂ p
δ p+O(ε2) (A.43c)
Compare (A.43) and (A.40), and similar comparison can be
done for quad( f (x¯+Kδ p, p¯+δ p))|x¯,p¯ and f (x¯+Kδ p, p¯+
δ p), we get the closeness results
quad ( f (φ(p), p))|x¯,p¯ = f (φ(p), p)+O(ε2) (A.44a)
quad( f (x¯+Kδ p, p¯+δ p))|x¯,p¯ = f (x¯+Kδ p, p¯+δ p)+O(ε2)
(A.44b)
Based on (A.44) and (A.42), we have the following inequal-
ities
f (φ(p), p)≤ f (x¯+Kδ p, p¯+δ p) (A.45a)
= quad( f (x¯+Kδ p, p¯+δ p))|x¯,p¯+O(ε2)
(A.45b)
≤ quad ( f (φ(p), p))|x¯,p¯ = f (φ(p), p)+O(ε2)
(A.45c)
= f (φ(p), p)+O(ε2) (A.45d)
Therefore, f (x¯+Kδ p, p¯+δ p) = f (φ(p), p)+O(ε2). 2
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